CURRENT LEGAL PERIODICALS.
INSURANCE.

Dejects of the Armstrong Committee's Legislation Relating to the
Dvidends of Mutual Life Insurance Policy Holders. Samuel P.
Clarke. The charter of the New York Mutual Life Insurance Company provides that the officers of the company, once in five years, or
oftener, "shall cause a balance to be struck of the affairs of the cornpany, and shall credit each member with an equitable share of the
protits." Mr. Clark prints a table of the payments and the dividends
on his policy for twenty years. He can find no explanation for the
mysteries which this table presents, or any system by which it can be
assumed the company could have been guided when deciding what
was an 'equitable share' of the profits to be paid as a dividend. In
view of this fact he seems to be justified in asking if the company has
acted on any principle, or if "their course from first to last has been
muddle-headed, capricious and arbitrary?"
The Armstrong Committee gives no satisfactory answer, but does find that the "amount
receivable by policy holders, whether their dividends have been
annual or deferred have been left to the discretion of its officers, and
their discretion has been exercised in such a manner that while the
returns to the policy holders have been diminished there has been a
steadily increasing surplus and a constant growth in the totals of
income, business and assets.' " Mr. Clarke proceeds to note the
principle which he believes should govern in ascertaining and distributing the surplus of Mutual Life Companies, and the objects of the
legislation favored by the Armstrong Committee. He claims that
"the boiled down essence of the 'actuary's theory and practice is,
'the more you pay the less you get!' and "so blinded, warped and set
by this theory is he, that he honestly believes this to be equitable.
C-ood -Lord, deliver us out of the hands of the actuary, and for our
judge give us somebody who knows iniquity when he sees it!" It is
contended that the Armstrong Committee, "by errors of principle,
has done a damage to the interests of policy holders, which, in the
long run, will greatly outweigh all the advantages that may result
from the Committee's good and skillful work in ferreting out admifiistrative abuses."
American Law Register, March-April, pp. 16x-i96.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.

Acquisition and Government of National Domain. David R. Watson.
Beginning with the perplexities of Jefferson, to whom the problem
first presented itself, and examining the decisions of the courts and the
acts and writings of executive officers and satesmen through the century which has followed Jefferson's administration, Mr. Watson
sums up the result as follows:"Foreign territory acquired by the United States is subject to two
classifications: First, territory which is incorporated into the United
States. This is subject to the provisions of the Constitution, and its
people are entitled to its benefits, including the Bill of Rights, com334
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monly known as the first ten amendments. Second: territory which
is not incorporated into the United States, but which may be regarded
as outlying territory. This is subject to be governed by Congress
under the powers granted in the Constitution applicable to such territory, not necessarily including all the provisions, of the Bill of Rights.
but subject to such limitations upon Congressional action as inhere
in the "prohibitions,' of the Constitution. Third, the United States
has full power to h Id annexed territory until its inhabitants are
qualified to become citizens thereof, and Congress may determine
how long that period shall continue.
American Law Review, March-April, pp. 239--254.

CRIMINAL LAw.

The true remedy for Lynch Law. Hannis Taylor. The wording of
the title to this article is such as to lead the reader in an examination
of the text in order to at once apprehend, and if possible acclaim, the
true, and presumably new, cure for this primitive method of punishment. The disappointment is great, therefore, when one meets with
the old arguments against the law's delays in this country and the
glorification of the criminal procedure of England. All this has been
discussed and re-discussed before. It is well known to all students of
the subject that while we are deploring our over-elaborate methods
over here, the English are earnestly asking that their over-simple
method of delivering the accused into the hands of a judge of an
inferior tribunal without hope of appeal from the arbitrary rulings
of that judge, shall be changed. The case of Beck, culminating in
the summer of 1904 in the "pardon" of that innocent person for
something he had not done, and for which he had suffered a long
term of imprisonment, opened the eyes of civilized and thinking
Englishmen to the very evident evils of their criminal procedure.
To cure our own ills by acquiring those of others who acknowledge
that they are suffering greatly under them, seems scarcely a "true"
remedy for them.
American Law Review, March-April,
pp. 255-266.

CONSPIRACY.

Conspiracy as a crime and as a Tort. Francis M. Burdick. Conspiracy as a crime has a full recognition in the courts; conspiracy as a
tort, however, does not occupy so well recognized a place.
Mr.
Burdick argues with ingenuity, cites cases with great skill, and appeals
to reason very successfully, to show that if it is true that the "essential elements, whether of a criminal or of an actionable conspiracy are
the same, though to sustain an action special damage must be proved"
it would seemto follow that we may haye the substantive tort of conspiracy, even when the acts to be done by the conspirators would be
actionable if done by them acting singly; that in such a case the
conspiracy is not a mere matter of aggravation of damages inflicted
by the various tortious acts, but is a cause of action by itself.
Mr. Burdick contends that the recognition of a tort of conspiracy
has practical advantages in that it enables the profession to treat
civil and criminal conspiracies to injure, as in pari passu; and that it
tends to diminish rather than to increase litigation.

Columbia Law Review, April, pp.

229-247.
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APPEALS.

Appella e Jurisdiction. Everett P. Wheeler. A short article but rnotable one. It condemns in severe language the mischiefs arising
from the present state of the law of appeals. Mr. Wheeler says, "the
trial of a case under this system has become a game, and if one of the
lawyers violates the rule of the game it must be played over again."
The tendency of the courts to render judgment on technical grounds
is severely condemned, and the lawyer who would take advantage of
such technicalities is very justly characterized in these words, "A lawyer whose first thought is to win his case on a technicality and not on
the merits may be a sharp attorney, but will never be a first rate
lawyer.
In every other profession clever tricks are discredited.
They ought to be in ours. The machinery of the courts should be so
constructed and administered as to make their success impossible,
and to do justice to every litigant according to the merits of his case.
After all, lawyers are made for clients-not clients for lawyers."
ColumNa Law Review, April, pp. 248-254.
BIOGRAPHY.

Frederic William Maitland. Gaillard Thomas Lapsley.
"It is
indeed a master that we have lost in the person of Frederic William
Maitland." says the biographer, and no one who has ever had the
pleasure and the profit given by an acquaintance with even one line
of Mr. Maitland's varied work, will refuse consent. The death of Mr.
Maitland is so great a disaster to the world of letters in which he
worked that it seems as if no words could be sufficiently expressive
of that loss. Mr. Lapsley knew, and studied under, Mr. Maitland,
and writing as a disciple says, "It is not only the learned world of
law, history and political philosophy that is bereaved by his death,
it is not only the University which he served and loved well-it is
rather every man who cares for learning and truth, for honest, tireless work and high-minded gentle living." He might well have added
to that list, all who care for literature that is a delight, for Mr. Maitland not only had that to say which was worth saying, he knew
how to say it worthily, and over and through all that he wrote played
the light of a wit, delicate, spontaneous, keen and yet kind..A wit
that gave to an American a vivid sense of kinship---a feeing that it is
believed he would not have repudiated.
Mr. Lapsley gives a detailed account of the work of Mr. Maitland,
showing his great activity, his enthusiasm, especially for that latest
work upon the Year Books which has been so immensely valuable,
and the vast debt which all students of the English law owe to him.
This latter part of the study, however, owing, perhapl, to the necessity of outlining so great an amount of work done, in so small a
space, seems rather dry .and devoid of that subtle atmosphere of
comprehension and appreciation which is the vital air of biography.
Green Bag. April, pp. 205-2r3.

